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ABSTRACT 
This article traces a developmental trajectory in Schmitt’s conception of law that brings out 
alternative conceptualizations of the exception. “Transcendence”, “immanence” and 
“integration” signify three different models to represent the relation between what I call 
“nomic force” (the particular phenomenon of bringing order) and “materiality” (the matter-of-
factness of a particular entity or phenomenon). I contend that while Political Theology feeds off a 
transcendent model, where a sovereign decider makes materiality speakable, The Concept of the 
Political shows important differences as Schmitt’s argument implies a novel conception of 
materiality, much indebted to an immanent model. Finally, in the years in which Schmitt 
embraces an institutional theory of law, between 1928 and 1934, he elaborated on a theory of law 
pivoted on integration. The chief claim of this article is that Schmitt’s conceptualization of 
exception and decision is conditional upon the relation between nomic power and materiality 
that underlies his reflection in these three phases.  
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1.  Introduction: transcendence, immanence, integration 
 
In his analysis of Carl Schmitt’s contribution to “politonomy”, Martin Loughlin 
(2016) points out that Schmitt’s overall oeuvre should be read as an exercise in 
political jurisprudence, that is, a type of juristic inquiry that aims to capture the 
character of the basic laws of the political. Loughlin contends that one fails to 
capture Schmitt’s key concerns unless due heed is paid to the texts in which he 
came to endorse an institutional conception of law which he called «konkretes 
Ordnungs- und Gestaltungsdenken» («concrete order and formation thinking»). I 
believe this interpretation does justice both to Schmitt’s self-understanding and to 
the efforts he put into solving the puzzles his previous decisionism had generated. 
Yet, Schmitt’s espousal of institutionalism, as well as the theoretical path that led 
him to it, have been abundantly debated in the last few years (see e.g. ARVIDSSON, 
BRÄNNSTRÖM, MINKKINEN 2016; CROCE, SALVATORE 2013; CROCE, SALVATORE 
2016a; LOUGHLIN 2016; MEIERHENRICH 2016). Therefore, it would be of little use to 
rehearse those analyses. Instead, what I set out to do in this article is ferret out a 
few key differences in Schmitt’s understanding of exceptionalism and decisionism 
that I believe depend on the conceptual framework he was building on.  
In effect according to some scholars (see e.g. BRÄNNSTRÖM 2016; MEIERHENRICH 
2016), manifest signs of an institutional thinking were already evident in the works 
of the 1920s, such as Political Theology (hereinafter PT) and Roman Catholicism and 
Political Form (SCHMITT 1996). While I agree that what is known as “decisionism”, 
developed by Schmitt early in the 1920s, is more transitory and occasional than 
most interpreters tend to believe, I think it is important to foreground the different 
background against which Schmitt gradually embraced institutionalism. My main 
argument for such a more accentuated sensitivity to progressive theoretical changes 
is that they help explain what role exception and decision really played in the early 
1920s and why Schmitt’s somewhat held onto decisionism but jettisoned 
exceptionalism. More in particular, and for my purposes, this approach singles out 
three phases in which Schmitt championed three different ways in which social 
entities or phenomena develop and organize their inner normativity. As I will 
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discuss, if in PT normality – that is, people’s everyday life within their practical 
frameworks – is entirely conditional upon someone who instantiates it through a 
miraculous irruption, in The Concept of the Political (hereinafter CoP) the conception 
of normality is certainly subtler, whereas in On the Three Types of Juristic Thought 
(hereinafter TTJT) normality hovers over norm and decision.  
To commence, I would like to introduce a terminology that is likely to help 
avoid confusion. For it is imperative to differentiate the concept of nomic power 
from that of normativity. Nomic power denotes the particular phenomenon of 
bringing order, the capacity to order. While the broader notion of normativity can 
be related to the general circumstances where customs or rules arise and are 
followed by social actors within practical spheres of varying dimensions, “nomic” 
qualifies the ordering character of a particular entity or phenomenon. The 
counterpoint to nomic power is “materiality”, as the matter-of-factness of a 
particular entity or phenomenon. My claim is that the gradual turn in Schmitt’s 
conception of law sheds light on various relations between nomic power and 
materiality. With reference to a terminology of his own, in Insurgencies Antonio 
Negri singles out three illustrative, prototypical ways of conceiving this relation: 
transcendence, immanence and integration.  
Transcendence evokes an ontological chasm between the nomic and the material. 
They are believed to dwell in altogether diverse spheres of social reality. While the 
material has no normative tinge, the nomic is that which bestows normative value 
on an otherwise normatively indifferent entity. Unsurprisingly, Negri mentions 
Hans Kelsen as the champion of transcendence. Although I will return to his theory 
below, it is worth recalling that Kelsen’s (1992, 23) theory of imputation creates a 
connection between a legal condition (a particular conduct) and a legal consequence 
(a sanction). The sanction that imputation attaches to a specific conduct within a 
legal order makes that conduct unlawful (and thus legally relevant). Accordingly, in 
Reine Rechtslehre, Kelsen (1992, 10) claims that «external circumstances» are events 
«perceptible to the senses» and «governed by causal laws», what happens in the 
social world is a chain of natural events governed by the laws of mechanics. This 
means that behaviours become legally relevant if and only if they are associated to a 
sanction by imputation. Such a separation between the material (one’s behaviour) 
and the nomic (the legal sanction), traditionally framed in terms of “ought” vs. “is”, 
maintains an ontological chasm between such two domains1. As I will discuss later, 
the consequences on the conception of law are relevant. 
 
 
1  I would like to thank one of the reviewers who emphasized the need to justify a transcendental inter-
pretation of Kelsen’s legal thinking. As I will only be concerned with this topic in so far as it illustrates 
Schmitt’s legal theory, I will limit myself to pointing to the literature that problematizes my interpreta-
tion, such as BULYGIN 1982; BULYGIN 1990; CELANO 1999; GUASTINI 1992; NINO 1985. 
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Immanence implies that materiality is intrinsically endowed with nomic force. In 
this case, Negri conjures Schmitt’s view of decision, as it is the nomic device that 
spawns an order and irradiates it with normative force. For Schmitt, there is no 
separation between the materiality of the order and its nomic source, as the 
sovereign decision is internal to the order. In effect, as I will illustrate in more 
detail, Schmitt’s claim that the decision is an integral element of the legal order is 
meant to bridge the gap between ought and is, in the sense that the norm is a by-
product of an original moment of creation. This is why, as Lars Vinx (2016, 45) 
points out, in Schmitt’s view «the founding decision taken by a people acting as 
constituent power enjoys a higher degree of democratic legitimacy than any 
possible outcome of constituted politics». We will see that this position was 
destined to change in Schmitt’s theoretical development, but as far as 
Verfassungslehre is concerned, it is true that the sovereign decision is “pure event as 
voluntary occurrence of power” (NEGRI 1999, 8). This is a power that validates the 
decision as the fountainhead of the constitutional order, because it draws the 
boundaries of the political community. This is why, says Vinx, Schmitt’s rejection 
of constitutional review on the part of a judicial body is coherent with his broader 
jurisprudential view. Since it is the fundamental decision, the inextinguishable 
source of nomic power, that has to be protected, rather than the text of the 
constitution as the by-product of the decision, the executive is better equipped to 
capture, read and nurture the form of life that that decision was meant to mark off.  
Integration gestures towards an oscillatory movement between the nomic and 
the material. There is no ontological gap between the two; nor is there an intrinsic 
identity. Nomic and material interpenetrate in the sense of a mutual necessitation. 
The position that best represents this approach is Costantino Mortati’s 
understanding of the material constitution (MORTATI 1998). In the context of the 
present article I cannot address such a seminal account of the relation between the 
nomic and the material. All that I can say is that Mortati makes room for two 
interlaced phases of the establishment of a constitutional order. First, the 
production of a particular model of political unity and social order, which is 
imposed by the convergence of the most powerful social forces and groups. This 
order has to be strong enough to mould and govern individual conducts and social 
interactions. Second, the production of a constitutional apparatus that is meant to 
fully achieve the ordering goals undergirding that particular model of political 
unity and social order. In this framework, government and legislation are devoted 
to the direct enforcement of the “material constitution” that that order incarnates; 
while administration and jurisdiction carry out complementary tasks to achieve 
the order’s goals. As any constitutional order is based on the concordant 
advancement of the material (the concrete model of social order) and the nomic 
(the constitutional machinery it gives life to), Negri (1999, 9) is right to emphasize 
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that what lies behind the constitution is an «ceaseless movement» which 
«determines its dynamic apparatus».  
As I noted, it is my conviction that Schmitt’s legal theory cannot be brought 
under one model, as the sequence itself of the three models makes sense of the 
gradual rethinking of his own conception of law and its relation to social 
normality. In what follows, I will cross more or less in depth PT, CoP and TTJT 
to sketch the diverse relation between nomic power and materiality envisaged by 
Schmitt in these works. I will conclude by discussing how the exception turns out 
to be affected by Schmitt’s changing orientation. 
 
 
2.  Transcendence 
 
Famously the first line of PT puts together two keystones in Schmitt’s influential 
lexicon: decision and state of exception. In short, the incipit «[s]overeign is he who 
decides on the state of exception» (SCHMITT 2005, 5) implies that the sovereign is 
the one who manages to make a decision that has so huge an impact on a political 
community as to determine a state of exception. This is why, in his reappraisal of 
the central role of political theology in the life of contemporary political 
communities, Paul Kahn (2011, 45) comments that «the exception depends upon a 
perception of threat». He insists on two main characteristics of the sovereign 
decision. First, it has to exert effects; second, it is not amenable to further 
normative scrutiny. Indeed, something is not a decision on account of the status 
of those who made it; nor is it because of the procedures that led to it. Rather, it is 
its effects that establish if something is a decision. This is the “situational” nature 
of the decision: it is the situation that determines if a decision is truly one of its 
kind. And it is such when its effects are decisive. While I will return to the 
character of decisiveness later on, it is of preliminary importance to underline, as 
does Kahn, the unjustifiable nature of a true decision.  
According to Leila Brännström, the a- or extra-legality of the decision is only 
apparent. It seems as such only from the point of view of constitutional 
liberalism, as the latter is unable to account for such a momentous genuinely legal 
phase. She then claims that in PT «the decision on the state of exception is a legal 
decision if made by the authorized subject» (BRÄNNSTRÖM 2016, 19). Brännström 
concludes that a decision is an authentic decision «only when […] “actual power” 
and “the legally highest power” come together» (BRÄNNSTRÖM 2016, 21). Based on 
this reading, the decider – an authorized one – can be identified before she makes 
her decision. As the «precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated» 
(SCHMITT 2005, 6), they cannot be codified and are destined to be left out of 
written law. But this only means that they cannot be put on paper despite 
constitutional liberalism’s tantalizing dream of codifying all that is legal. In 
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reality, according to Brännström’s reading, just as much as in his later 
institutional phase, Schmitt understands the exception as a suspension of the 
order intended to protect and reinstate (when threatened) the concrete order that 
the legal order crystallizes and stabilizes. Schmitt’s case for bringing the exception 
back into the realm of the legal is thus claimed to amount to justifying the 
genuine legality of the exception as a circumstance of utmost peril in which an 
authorized person or body is called upon to take extreme measures to protect the 
communal form of life. 
Although this interpretation is intriguing because it traces Schmitt’s concern with 
the concrete order back to PT, it misses out on a central aspect of his understanding 
of the exception. As I hinted, Kahn (2011, 40) emphasizes that the decision on the 
state of exception has to be assessed against the effects it produces: «A decision with 
no effect is not a decision. […] The sovereign power is not that of recognizing or 
identifying the exception; it is the power to decide on the exception». If the author 
of the decision were to be previously authorized, she would not be the decider 
because of the decision’s effects, but on account of the authorization that qualifies 
her as the decider. Therefore, while Schmitt was at pains to bring the notion of 
exception within the borders of legal theory, as a paramount legal concept, he was 
not thinking of an authorization prior to the decision. For it is the series of effects 
on the social world that determines who the sovereign decider is2. I would like to 
describe these effects with reference to performativity, that is, an utterance’s power to 
make the world correspond to what is uttered. On this account, deciding on the state 
of exception means saying that the community is in a state of exception and that 
legal normality is ipso facto suspended. Performativity does not make room for 
anything prior or posterior: it is a timeless event that either occurs or does not occur. 
As the words uttered “this is a state of exception” succeed in creating the state of 
exception, legal normality is suspended. This is the reason why most interpreters 
envision a link between PT and CoP: the state of exception is the circumstance in 
which the decider declares, decides on who the enemy is and by doing so, 
performatively, brings the friend into existence.  
What is at stake here is the degree of materiality vis-à-vis the jurisgenerative 
activity of nomic power. If Brännström were right, the decision would be meant 
to protect a pre-existing normality, a concrete order, and the state of exception 
would amount to the series of measures taken by the authorized guardian of the 
 
 
2  Brännström has a point when she remarks that the meanings Schmitt associates to the word 
“Ausnahme” (exception) are at least four. So, while in one sense – i.e. exception as “extreme emergen-
cy” – the decider could in principle be legally identified (depending on the jurisdiction in question), in 
the sense of “state of exception” the decider cannot be previously authorized. Indeed, while «[t]he sov-
ereign produces and guarantees the situation in its totality», it is the exception that «reveals most clearly 
the essence of the state’s authority», so much so that authority «to produce law it need not be based on 
law» (SCHMITT 2005, 13). 
44 | Mariano Croce 
community. If this were the case, the decision and the exception would play a 
restorative role with a view to preserving the concrete order. On this account, 
materiality and nomic power seem to be in a relation of integration that justifies 
and authorizes the deciding (protective) power of the sovereign. I do not think 
this is the case, though. However tenable, this interpretation plays down 
Schmitt’s dismissive attitude to normality. In PT the normal is identified with the 
regularity of everyday life which is governed by the normal provision of the legal 
order. Truly enough, Schmitt insisted that the normal situation has to be in full 
swing for the legal order to work properly: «For a legal order to make sense, a 
normal situation must exist» (SCHMITT 2005, 13). Still he adds that it is the 
sovereign that «decides whether this normal situation actually exists» (SCHMITT 
2005, 13). In other words, the normal situation is not the bearer of a nomic power 
residing in the materiality of a form of life. Quite the reverse, the source of nomic 
power that infuses the materiality of the normal situation is the sovereign. Her 
performative act of determining what counts as a threat marks the boundaries of 
the community and brings its material content into life. 
Despite this, the creative nature of the act of deciding should not be overstated. 
I think that a more tenable interpretation of PT lies midway between the 
exceptionalist reading and Brännström’s more concretist reading. While the 
exceptionalist reading pins on the sovereign a miraculous creative power, the 
concretist reading overestimates the role of the concrete order. It is my contention 
that Schmitt, contra Kelsen, was trying to tease out the jurisprudential import of 
the exception. The positivist conception of law as coordination mechanism 
playing out as a timetable downright dismisses the connection between norm and 
normality. In the terminology I am using here, Schmitt denied the source of 
nomic power being the norm. He thought Kelsen made a mistake in conceiving 
the norm (or better, the sanction) as that which confers normative value on the 
conduct it brings into the legal domain. At the same time, though, Schmitt did not 
believe that materiality intrinsically possesses nomic power. Rather, «[w]hat 
matters for the reality of legal life is who decides» (SCHMITT 2005, 34). 
Accordingly, the relation is such that the legal norm depends on a situation of 
normality, while the latter depends on the deciding power of a sovereign.  
This chain of dependence, so to say, explains the elusive passage that closes the 
first chapter of PT, where Schmitt quotes from Kierkegaard’s Repetition3. In the 
juncture in question, Kierkegaard (2009, 77 f.) contends that the exception is key 
to understanding the universal and that, therefore, those who aim to study the 
latter should first and foremost concentrate on the former. Most of those who 
have examined Schmitt’s use of Kierkegaard’s words4 claim that they are based on 
 
 
3  On the relationship between the two authors see RYAN 2011. 
4  See e.g. CONRAD 2008; GOULD 2013. 
D&Q, 2017/2 | 45 
a fundamental misreading – and in effect most often Schmitt was quite an 
unfaithful and mischievous reader5. Based on a conventional understanding of the 
exception, some say that «Kierkegaard, unlike Schmitt, wanted to preserve the 
antinomy between exception and norm. In order for exception to be oppositional 
and to function as a critique of the norm, it must be aberrant» (GOULD 2013, 5). In 
truth, Kierkegaard (2009, 78) writes that «[t]he vigorous and determined 
exception which, despite its struggle with the universal, is an offshoot of it, 
preserves itself. The relationship is this: the exception grasps the universal to the 
extent that it thoroughly grasps itself». Shortly thereafter, Kierkegaard specifies 
that only some exceptions qualify as exceptions:  
 
«The legitimate exception is reconciled with the universal; the universal is at its basis 
polemically opposed to the exception. It will not reveal its infatuation with the exception 
until the exception forces it to do so. If the exception does not have the strength to do this, 
then it is not legitimate».  
 
In light of these junctures, and in line with the interpretation I am advancing, I 
believe Schmitt did not misread Kierkegaard, as the latter’s words articulate the 
relationship between the exception and the general that Schmitt had in mind. If 
one regards the exception as the miraculous and foundational moment in which a 
decision is made and society is brought to order, then one fails to appreciate the 
productive relationship between the exception and the general as two poles of an 
unceasing dialectic. Kierkegaard’s words capture at best this relationship as a 
polemical opposition whereby the exception is meant to reveal something important 
about the general. If it is undeniable that Schmitt mistranslated the word 
“legitimate” (see RYAN 2011, 185), this does not impinge on the role that Schmitt 
attributed to the exception. In fact, when he claimed that, in order for an 
exception to be what it is, it has to be “wirklichen” (“true” or “authentic”), he 
meant to stress its role as a disclosure more than a purely creative moment. To be 
an actual, genuine exception, it has to reveal something of its opposite, that is, the 
general. By thoroughly grasping itself, the genuine exception grasps the universal 
and thus makes it visible. In other words, PT sets in motion a relation whereby 
the exception makes normality speakable: it performatively articulates something 
that would not speak for itself and needs to be uttered by someone who does not 
create it but brings it to light. This is why the paradigm that emerges out of PT 
falls within the scope of what Andrea Salvatore and I (CROCE, SALVATORE 2016a) 
call “social semantics”: reality is “spoken” by someone who pronounces the words 
 
 
5  On Schmitt’s partial manipulation of the original text see RYAN 2011, 185. 
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that make it visible. The normal is not speakable unless someone – in Schmitt’s 
case, the sovereign who makes the effective decision – speaks it in the first place. 
This is why, all in all, the relation between nomic power and materiality Schmitt’s 
envisaged in the early 1920s is still describable in terms of transcendence: for normality 
to be what it is, it needs a powerful utterer who brings it into the domain of the 
speakable. Materiality does not possess any nomic force of its own, as it is vested 
with normative power by the disclosing utterance of the decider. It is still too early 
for the concrete order to make its appearance, especially if it is conceived, as Schmitt 
did a few years later, as the repository of an uncreated nomic power.  
 
 
3.  Immanence 
 
However counterintuitive, CoP offers a first telling pointer to Schmitt’s gradual 
revision of his own theory of social order6. In effect, at face value CoP lends itself to 
an exceptionalist reading. The content of the decision made by the miraculous 
sovereign Schmitt spoke of in PT is the enemy. This foundational decision 
instantiates the friend, to the extent that the latter is entirely conditional upon the 
expulsion of the perilous element that poses so serious a threat to the community – 
which is itself created in this decision-making process. In other words, the political 
community is generated by the performative power of “uttering the enemy”.  
While CoP teems with evidence supporting this interpretation, I think an 
alternative reading is likely to shed some more light on a few junctures of this 
work that would otherwise make little sense. Although enigmatic at first, the 
opening line of this book – «The concept of the state presupposes the concept of 
the political» (SCHMITT 2007, 19) – is a gesture to the contingent experience of 
Western statehood. Schmitt intended to criticize theories that regarded the 
connection between the state and the political as necessary and trans-historical. 
He thought that as the state acquired a stable monopoly on the jus belli, it could 
lose such a monopoly just as easily. In short, Schmitt’s argument reads that the 
state could cease to be the linchpin of the political at the moment in which it is no 
longer able to prevent conflicts between social parties. To put it otherwise, 
Schmitt’s idea of politics is a pacified state of coexistence where the political 
conflict is unthinkable. The role of normality is much more prominent here; for 
normal life is what has to be protected. At the same time, within the socio-
semantic framework that animated PT, the widespread view of the community 
members cannot accommodate any idea of conflict with other members that 
might bring into question their fundamental allegiance to the community. The 
 
 
6  I discuss this topic at length in CROCE 2017. This is why my discussion here will be more cursory. 
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state ceases to undertake the task it was born to carry out when it allows the idea 
of a conflict to materialize. 
As Schmitt’s troubled relationship with the advocates of the pluralist state 
demonstrates (see SCHMITT 2007, 40-45 and SCHMITT 2000), he reckoned with 
human beings’ natural tendency to overproduce normative contexts and to 
differentiate themselves from the others. In the face of it, he thought the only way 
to secure the community’s stability is to create a space where people’s basic 
allegiance and loyalty to the state could make a political conflict unthinkable. In 
effect, a conflict is political where it reaches the «utmost degree of intensity» 
(SCHMITT 2007, 26) so much so that it aggregates and disaggregates: the very idea 
of there being a political conflict performatively sets in motion a potentially fatal 
opposition between friend and enemy. The community would end up irreparably 
riven and fragmented into non-state sub-divisions. For the state to ward off this 
eventuality, it must make sure that the community members’ allegiance and 
loyalty to the state might surpass any other allegiance and loyalty to non-state 
groups. This explains Schmitt’s aversion to the theory of pluralist state: its 
supporters made a point as to the pluralist nature of human sociality, but precisely 
because of this, the state should keep the idea of a political conflict at bay and 
make sure that its citizens could not construct more intense sub- or supra-state 
forms of belonging and membership.  
Although the socio-semantic idea of a basic symbolic worldview that makes the 
community speakable is still in place, CoP sets forth a different relation of the 
nomic to the material than the one underlying PT. While in the latter writing the 
decision is presented as that which discloses the normal, in CoP the community is 
thought to be imbued with a foundational distinction between the friend and the 
enemy: the enemy is what lies outside the boundaries of the community (or the 
internal menace that has be expunged from the community). The basic, 
constitutive (and most often unaware) intuition of the community as a form of 
life where conflicts cannot arise saturates the members’ political imagery. With 
no such intuitive allegiance, the state would be unable to prevent the 
materialization of intersectional conflicts, both as an imagined and a concrete 
possibility. In this regard, the social order Schmitt envisaged in CoP bears a 
striking resemblance to the concrete order he would speak of a few years later in 
TTJT. Despite this, the relation between the nomic and the material is closer to 
the model of immanence. Indeed, Schmitt toyed with the idea of something that 
saturates the political view of citizens and tames their potential differentiation 
into threatening sub-groups. This something – what in Constitutional Theory 
represents the people’s fundamental decision – is immanent to the order. The 
latter vanishes as this something is brought into question. Between state-
sponsored friendship – the nomic – and the community life – the material – there 
is a relationship of intrinsic correspondence.  
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4.  Integration 
 
To recap, PT puts forward the image of a mighty social utterer whose decision 
makes normality speakable and sets the stage for the legal order to work 
effectively. CoP emphasizes the importance of a stable normality where the idea 
of a conflict never arises. While in 1922 the conception of a decision as a 
possibility condition for normal life inclines to transcendence, Schmitt’s 
preoccupation with warding off the rift between friend and enemy convey the 
sense of an immanent relation between the nomic and the material. Nevertheless, 
in 1928 Schmitt stated to focus on what is to be done for the state to keep the 
monopoly on the political. He never cared to explain what it is that puts the 
friends together. As Negri notes, like in Constitutional Theory, it is as if an original, 
fundamental decision on what the community should be like were able to 
permeate any future decisions of the community.  
As I noted earlier, while the literature on Schmitt’s institutionalism is 
burgeoning, it would be pointless to trace the steps he took to overhaul his 
previous decisionism7. Suffice it to say that his encounter with the institutional 
theory of Maurice Hauriou and Santi Romano brought him to reflect on the role 
of materiality, namely, the set of social practices and normative networks 
developed by social actors in everyday life. As a matter of fact, Schmitt found 
what he always had right under his nose, that is, the nomic force of the material 
inscribed in the daily activity of the community members. He came to recognize 
that those micro-practices which over time give life to macro-practices – to wit, 
broader, time-tested social institutions – can hardly emerge out of a decision. To 
stick to my terminology, the social grammarian that in PT towers over normal life 
and the law can neither create social normativity nor make it speakable. This is 
more or less what Schmitt wrote in the preface to the second edition of PT 
(November 1933): «I now distinguish not two but three types of legal thinking; in 
addition to the normativist and the decisionist types there is the institutional 
one», which «unfolds in institutions and organizations that transcend the 
personal sphere» (SCHMITT 2005, 2-3). Now the previous union of decisionism 
and normativism is dismissed as a «formless mixture, unsuitable for any 
structure» (SCHMITT 2005, 3). If it is true that he hastened to underline the risks 
of an institutionalism deprived of the props of decisionism and normativism – 
«an isolated institutional thinking leads to the pluralism characteristic of a feudal-
corporate growth that is devoid of sovereignty» (SCHMITT 2005, 3) – it is just as 
true that in these years Schmitt provided the most compelling arguments against 
what in the present article I refer to as “transcendence”. 
 
 
7  For a more detailed analysis see CROCE, SALVATORE 2013. 
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In TTJT, the transcendent element of the triad normativism, decisionism and 
institutionalism is obviously represented by the first. Schmitt excoriates the 
normativist conception of law as a mere set of norms, or even worse, a set of norms 
joined together by a fundamental norm. He argues that legal scholars who understand 
the legal order as an “impersonal” technique of description, whereby some conducts 
are brought into the legal domain and in this way are made legal, neglect the essential 
connection between social and legal normativity. For they see legal prohibitions as 
intellectually fabricated norms that turn a normatively indifferent conduct into a 
crime. As they are put together, legal norms form a system, which serves to assess 
reality from the special vantage point of the law. The relation between social reality 
and the law is purely descriptive: there is no substantive, let alone ontological link 
between the two domains. The law is an instrument in the hands of officials to 
determine what ought to follow when a particular fact occurs. All that is legal can be 
reduced to norms, which in their systematic conjunction saturate the legal panorama. 
Such «an increasingly sharper separation of norm and reality» (SCHMITT 2004, 52) 
takes social reality out of the picture.  
It has to be noted that Schmitt’s preoccupation with the normality of social 
conducts and practices exhibits decidedly novel nuances. Unlike in PT, he does not 
insist on the jurisgenerative force of the decision, which in 1922 was presented as the 
possibility condition for normality. Instead, he criticizes normativist jurisprudence’s 
myopia to social normativity. As discussed by Lars Vinx, a first telling symptom of 
his interest in the normal, quotidian activity of institutional practices can be found in 
Constitutional Theory, as Schmitt gave a particular twist to the topic of constitutional 
rights: «In the later Weimar years […] Schmitt put forward a theory of “institutional 
guarantees”, according to which many constitutional provisions that appear to protect 
individual rights merely protect the existence of certain social institutions» (VINX 
2016, 42)8. While this obviously entails demeaning individual rights or even putting 
them in danger, it also gives a sense of what, in Schmitt’s view, deserved 
constitutional protection. Vinx (2016, 43) goes on to say: 
 
[T]he protection of the constitution does not primarily consist in the enforcement of legal 
norms protecting individual rights but, rather, in the defence, against insurrectionary 
challenges, of a certain form of social and political ordering that has already been declared 
off-limits to peaceful legislative change, it obviously makes sense to argue that the task of 
defending the constitution must fall to executive and not to the courts.  
 
In that particular period between 1928 and 1933 Schmitt’s attention is progressively 
drawn to materiality. He was toying with the idea that normativity does not 
 
 
8  On the revelatory importance of “institutional guarantees” see also Andrea Salvatore’s considerations 
in CROCE, SALVATORE 2013, 26–29. 
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spring from the decision of a miraculous sovereign, but from one that emanates 
and at the same time is emanated by a concrete form of life. Indeed, Constitutional 
Theory fosters a conception of decision as deeply imbued with materiality. It is a 
decision on a concrete order (significantly, not on a state of exception) whose 
nomic power projects itself onto the future of a political community: «The 
constitution does not establish itself. It is, rather, given to a concrete political 
unity» (SCHMITT 2008, 76). Yet only later, most likely because of his closer 
involvement with Hauriou’s and Romano’s theories, did he clarify what this 
materiality is – namely, the normality of the concrete situation. In 1934, he made 
it clear that the legal system only works insofar as it presupposes «the system of 
coordination of a concrete order» (SCHMITT 2004, 71) that allows discriminating 
right from wrong. In other words, the concrete order is the possibility condition 
for determining what is lawful and what is not. The connection between legally 
wrong (the Kelsenian “delict”) and socially wrong is as strong as the connection 
between legally right and socially right. 
Despite the inextricable connection between social and legal normativity, TTJT 
– the book that ratifies Schmitt’s adhesion to legal institutionalism – is 
characterized by what Negri names “integration”. On the one hand, the 
transcendence of normativism, and positivist normativism in particular, is bitterly 
rejected not only as theoretically mistaken but even as morally depreciable because 
of its insensitivity to social normativity. On the other hand, however, social 
normativity does not coincide with the legal and political order. TTJT portrays 
widespread and repeated models of action that crystallize into historical 
institutional patterns (marriage, family, the army, etc.). As Schmitt put it, from 
Luther to Hegel, the culmination of the German culture, German authors always 
cherished the concreteness of the German form of life that is embodied in a 
delimited set of age-old institutions. In Schmitt’s picture, this materiality seems to 
be at one and the same time independent of the legal order and in permanent need 
of political protection. The widespread normality of institutional patterns can never 
be translated into a body of formal norms. For example, the “good head of family”, 
the “brave soldier”, the “duty-conscious bureaucrat” (SCHMITT 2004, 55) can hardly 
be codified in detail. They, as it were, live a life of their own within the daily 
practice of the German people. Yet, the legal order cannot limit itself to registering 
the practical activity of social actors. As TTJT emphasizes time and again, a legal 
order that is inspired to concrete-order thinking is required to introduce the 
complementary elements of normativism and decisionism. Like concrete-order 
thinking, these two types of juristic thoughts are both “autonomous” and “eternal”, 
in that they throw light on essential features of the law. Only through an 
integration of normativism, decisionism and institutionalism can Schmitt offer a 
stronger and more complete conceptual understanding of the relation between 
society and law. 
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Needless to say, integration does not merely take place at a theoretical level. 
Schmitt remarked many a time that conceptual frameworks reflect, and at once 
support, particular social and juridico-political arrangements. But arguably this is 
the flimsiest feature of Schmitt’s institutionalism. Andrea Salvatore and I have 
called Schmitt’s institutional solution “institutionalist decisionism”. As I 
explained above, Schmitt found pluralist theories of the state both attractive and 
repulsive. For he believed they provide a tenable understanding of social 
normativity but fail to identify the risks associated to freestanding social 
collectivities and plural normative frameworks. He was adamant that social 
pluralism is the fiercest enemy of the state as a political project. Therefore, he 
thought it behoves the state to protect the set of institutions comprising the 
concrete order by making sure that all relevant institutions may incorporate a set 
of standards that guarantee the community’s basic homogeneity. Obviously, this 
kind of homogeneity could not be obtained either through a miraculous decision 
or through a constitutional one. As a society’s institutional tapestry is the product 
of time, a different type of integration is needed. Schmitt had in mind a 
hierarchical chain of command and responsibility connecting people who operated 
as leading figures within the various institutions and were answerable to a Leader 
– the ultimate interpreter of the concrete order. 
 
 
5.  Invisible exceptions 
 
Although the ill-fated political upshot of this theoretical proposal is in plain view, 
I would like to leave this issue aside and discuss what image of exception the three 
models discussed so far have to offer. Kahn’s (2011) interesting application of 
Schmitt’s political theology to current (mostly US) politics reads the exception as 
a wake-up call for liberals to get to grips with the harshness of real politics. 
Political theology gives the lie to the political of the contract whereby the state 
establishes peace and order for humans’ stable coordination and lays stress on 
political violence as a form of sacrifice. It puts «sacrifice at the point of origin» 
(KAHN 2011, 7). And yet, the sacrificial nature of political is not an initial, far-
flung phase of production, as it infiltrates everyday politics regularly. For even 
when a constitutional court «declares a law unconstitutional, it is invoking some 
sort of exception: its decision marks the endpoint of the ordinary course of 
legislative majorities responding to shifting political interests» (KAHN 2011, 9). 
Kahn’s conclusion is that «the exception is a necessary condition of any social 
order because human relations can never be treated as if they were simply natural 
phenomena that repeat themselves» (KAHN 2011, 113). 
There is no denying that Schmitt’s theory of exception and decision in the early 
1920s can be interpreted along these lines. Certainly he had all intentions of 
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uncovering the blind spot that makes liberalism unserviceable, as it fails to 
explain what happens when the everyday routine of legal life is on the blink and 
what should be done when this circumstance arises. Yet, I believe that this largely 
obscures Schmitt’s concern with the relation between norm and normality. In PT 
he thought this issue should be looked at through the prism of the exception. 
Kelsenian positivism provided us with an impoverished conception of normality 
as the inert material that can be assessed against the calculability of the legal 
norm. Schmitt reacted to this stance by advancing the imaginative conception of a 
social primer who, through her words, instantiates community life. In this 
framework, the exception plays out as the primeval utterance that brings society 
about. As I argued, this does not make the sovereign a creator, but as someone 
who exerts performative effects on the social by drawing the boundaries of the 
political community. CoP moves away from the abstractness of PT’s conception as 
it placed emphasis on the friend: the state’s constitutive task is to defend 
normality by deactivating the performative occurrence of political conflicts 
within the community borders. Normality becomes the pivot of Schmitt’s 
reasoning. The exception is no longer what instantiates the community, but a 
condition of peril that has to be avoided at all costs. 
Still, the passage from transcendence to immanence did not solve the problem of 
what confers nomic power on the materiality of practices. Schmitt’s later adherence 
to institutionalism made him change his mind about materiality’s nomic force. It 
comes neither from a sovereign primer nor from a founding decision that 
constitutes the community of friends. The nomic inheres in social practices that do 
not need the political to be normatively active. At the same time, these practices 
need the political for them to exorcize the permanent risk of internal differentiation 
and disaggregation. Here the exception is deprived of its pre-eminent position in 
Schmitt’s conception of law. The exception does not uncover; nor is there a 
founding, joint decision that brings the community about. The community is 
already there, as it made its way through time and history by developing a well-
defined set of institutional practices. In Schmitt’s reactionary understanding, the 
state has the duty to attach legal value to, and protect, those institutions. 
In conclusion, the theoretical trajectory from Schmitt’s initial exceptionalism to 
his later concrete-order thinking demonstrates that no exception is needed by a 
political sovereign who wants to keep her subjects together and her community 
alive. The view he elaborated on between 1928 and 1934 (and that he held on to 
afterwards) is far closer to a day-by-day activity of normalization whereby 
officials faithful to a political centre implement specific guidelines to domesticate 
humans’ innate tendency to normative pluralism. Not only does the exception not 
generate social homogeneity; it could even be detrimental to it as it produces 
hazardous social rifts. The exception is the extreme situation that could draw the 
experience of statehood to a close. While Kahn is right that the exception in 
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contemporary societies characterizes routine politics more than many are inclined 
to think, the activity of normalization Schmitt imagined – however, as I 
remarked, affected by serious flaws – is much more widespread and capillary9. For 
sure, this is one trait of today’s liberal constitutional regime that Schmitt would 
appreciate (though not many others of them, I submit). Apart from Schmitt’s 
personal political inclinations, we could take it as an invitation to concentrate on 
the myriad invisible manners in which various processes of normalization are 
carried out on a daily basis. An invitation to look out for the exception in the 
utterly unexceptional. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
9  I cannot expand on this aspect here. Yet see CROCE, SALVATORE 2016b. 
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